VERIF·AI

defence, aerospace and security · global · high complexity

Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence

Inside BAE Systems PLC

BAE Systems grew turnover 14% in FY2024, yet pre-tax profit rose just £6m — and investing cash burned nearly ten times what it did a year ago.

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Company No.01470151
Statusactive
Latest accountsFY2024 accounts
Filed 30 June 2025 10 months ago

Origin

BAE Systems PLC

BAE Systems plc is one of the world's largest defence and aerospace companies, designing and manufacturing combat aircraft, naval vessels, armoured vehicles, and electronic systems. It operates across the UK, US, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and other allied nations under long-term government contracts.

At a glance

Key data

Founded 1979 8 years on file
Turnover £26.31bn ▲ +14.0% YoY
Pre-tax profit £2.33bn ◆ 0.3% YoY
Auditor

Timeline

How we got here

2022 01 of 07

Big year-on-year change

Net assets jump

Net assets grew 49% — from £7.67bn to £11.40bn.

2021 02 of 07

Big year-on-year change

Net assets surge

Net assets surged 56% — from £4.92bn to £7.67bn.

2019 03 of 07

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax jump

Profit after tax grew 48% — from £1.03bn to £1.53bn.

2017 04 of 07

Where our data starts

Financial deep-dive begins

Earliest analysed accounts: FY2017. 17 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.

2000 05 of 07

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as British Aerospace Public Limited Company.

1981 06 of 07

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as British Aerospace Limited.

1979 07 of 07

Company founded

Incorporated

BAE Systems PLC was registered at Companies House on 1979-12-31.

02 · Financials

The numbers, year by year

FY2024 accounts · Companies House

Scene 01 · Revenue

Turnover up 53% in 7 years

From £17.22bn in FY2017 to £26.31bn in FY2024 — a 53% increase.

Annual Turnover vs Cost of Sales

FY2017 – FY2024 · Companies House

Turnover Cost of Sales Gross Profit
£12.83bn £16.73bn £20.63bn £24.52bn £28.42bn FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 FY2024

Scene 02 · Metrics

The headline numbers

Cash at bank £3.38bn ▼ 16.9% vs £4.07bn FY2023 A meaningful slip — well below last year's reading.
Turnover £26.31bn ▲ +14.0% vs £23.08bn FY2023 Moderate single-digit growth — in line with typical year-on-year movement.
Pre-tax profit £2.33bn ◆ 0.3% vs £2.33bn FY2023
Net assets £11.78bn ▲ +9.8% vs £10.72bn FY2023 Moderate single-digit growth — in line with typical year-on-year movement.

Financial health

Good · 4 signals

Low current ratio High leverage Net assets growing Profitable
+ Why this rating
  • Low current ratio — Current ratio of 0.87 — current liabilities exceed current assets
  • High leverage — Debt-to-equity of 2.24 — the company is heavily indebted relative to its equity
  • Net assets growing — Net assets grew 9.8% year-on-year — the company is building value
  • Profitable — PBT of £2,332,000,000 on turnover of £26,312,000,000

Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities

Financial performance trends

Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time

Turnover Gross profit Operating
20172018201920202021202220232024

Scene 05 · Full detail

Complete P&L statement

All metrics across FY2017–FY2024, now fully contextualised by the story above.

Profit and loss
£
Metric FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024 Δ YoY
Turnover £17.22bn £16.82bn £18.30bn £19.28bn £19.52bn £21.26bn £23.08bn £26.31bn ▲ 14%
Cost of sales -£16.04bn
Gross profit
Other operating income £131.0m £158.0m £150.0m £270.0m £472.0m £215.0m £204.0m £266.0m ▲ 30%
Administrative expenses -£16.04bn -£15.51bn -£16.72bn -£17.69bn -£17.74bn -£19.27bn
Operating profit £1.42bn £1.60bn £1.90bn £1.93bn £2.39bn £2.38bn £2.57bn £2.69bn ▲ 4%
Finance income £416.0m £228.0m £27.0m £17.0m £32.0m £47.0m £172.0m £135.0m ▼ 22%
Finance costs -£762.0m -£609.0m -£300.0m -£351.0m -£279.0m -£395.0m -£419.0m -£488.0m ▼ 16%
Profit before tax £1.07bn £1.22bn £1.63bn £1.60bn £2.11bn £1.99bn £2.33bn £2.33bn — 0%
Tax -£216.0m -£191.0m -£94.0m -£225.0m -£198.0m -£315.0m -£386.0m -£291.0m ▲ 25%
Profit after tax £857.0m £1.03bn £1.53bn £1.37bn £1.91bn £1.67bn £1.94bn £2.04bn ▲ 5%
EBITDA (memo)
Balance sheet
£
Metric FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024 Δ YoY
Intangible assets £10.38bn £10.66bn £10.37bn £11.74bn £11.72bn £12.64bn £12.10bn £16.26bn ▲ 34%
Tangible assets £2.23bn £2.37bn £2.44bn £2.65bn £4.01bn £4.72bn £3.63bn £4.84bn ▲ 33%
Investments £328.0m £442.0m £441.0m £409.0m £630.0m £886.0m £916.0m £906.0m ▼ 1%
Total fixed assets £14.65bn £15.17bn £16.39bn £18.12bn £18.32bn £20.83bn £20.29bn £26.39bn ▲ 30%
Stocks £733.0m £774.0m £835.0m £858.0m £811.0m £976.0m £1.16bn £1.32bn ▲ 15%
Debtors £4.24bn £5.18bn £5.94bn £6.00bn £4.83bn £6.17bn £6.82bn £7.40bn ▲ 8%
Cash at bank £3.27bn £3.23bn £2.59bn £2.77bn £2.92bn £3.11bn £4.07bn £3.38bn ▼ 17%
Total current assets £8.38bn £9.58bn £9.24bn £9.41bn £8.82bn £10.63bn £11.77bn £11.75bn — 0%
Trade creditors -£6.75bn -£7.74bn -£4.39bn -£4.90bn -£4.64bn -£4.99bn -£5.44bn -£6.38bn ▼ 17%
Bank loans (current) -£14.0m -£785.0m -£377.0m -£467.0m -£457.0m -£53.0m -£679.0m -£699.0m ▼ 3%
Total current liabilities £7.59bn £9.31bn £9.13bn £9.38bn £8.70bn £9.85bn £10.94bn £12.34bn ▲ 13%
Net current assets £789.0m £269.0m £111.0m £23.0m £122.0m £788.0m £830.0m -£589.0m ▼ 171%
Total assets less current liabilities £15.44bn £15.44bn £16.50bn £18.15bn £18.44bn £21.62bn £21.12bn £25.80bn ▲ 22%
Bank loans (non-current) -£4.07bn -£3.51bn -£3.02bn -£4.96bn -£4.60bn -£5.19bn -£4.43bn -£7.71bn ▼ 74%
Long-term liabilities £10.69bn £9.82bn £10.99bn £13.23bn £10.77bn £10.22bn £10.40bn £14.02bn ▲ 35%
Provisions £835.0m £761.0m £685.0m £677.0m £607.0m £587.0m £572.0m £617.0m ▲ 8%
Net assets £4.75bn £5.62bn £5.51bn £4.92bn £7.67bn £11.40bn £10.72bn £11.78bn ▲ 10%
Total equity £4.75bn £5.62bn £5.51bn £4.92bn £7.67bn £11.40bn £10.72bn £11.78bn ▲ 10%
Cash flow
£
Metric FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024 Δ YoY
Net cash from operating activities £1.90bn £1.20bn £1.60bn £1.17bn £2.45bn £2.84bn £3.76bn £3.92bn ▲ 4%
Net cash used in investing activities -£360.0m -£341.0m -£232.0m -£2.04bn £66.0m -£422.0m -£541.0m -£5.27bn ▼ 874%
Net cash used in financing activities -£995.0m -£932.0m -£1.96bn £973.0m -£2.26bn -£2.33bn -£2.19bn £695.0m ▲ 132%
Net increase / (decrease) in cash £542.0m -£73.0m -£597.0m £102.0m £257.0m £84.0m £1.03bn -£649.0m ▼ 163%
Cash at end of year £3.26bn £3.23bn £2.59bn £2.67bn £2.92bn £3.11bn £4.07bn £3.38bn ▼ 17%

Scene 04 · Waterfall

From revenue to profit

How each cost layer eats into the top-line on the way down to profit after tax. Cascade chart coming in the next release — for now the table below shows the same flow.

  1. Revenue£26.31bn
  2. Operating profit£2.69bn
  3. Tax−£644.0m
  4. Profit after tax£2.04bn

FY2024 accounts · cascade view

03 · Risk

What the filings reveal

Concrete signals · descriptive only

Working capital + cash

Where the money sits

Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.

Short-term cover Current ratio · liquidity 0.95× For every £1 of bills due in the next 12 months, they have 95p of cash and quickly-sellable assets to pay it. Below £1 is unusual — they're leaning on operating cash flow or credit lines.
Profit-to-cash Cash conversion · earnings quality 146% Every £1 of reported operating profit turned into £1.46 of actual cash. Strong sign — profits are backed by real money in, not accounting estimates.
Customer payment speed Debtor days · working capital 103 Around 103 days to collect — over four months. Long for most industries; can mean dispute, slow public-sector buyers, or generous payment terms.
Brand & goodwill share Intangibles ratio · asset quality 42.6% A notable 42.6% of the balance sheet is intangible — patents, brands, goodwill. Real value but harder to verify if challenged.

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO sanctions screen Potential sanctions · 5 reviewsLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Status · Active

Governance & subsequent events

Who controls this entity, what's changed since year-end

Post-balance-sheet event · December 2024

Agreement reached with Leonardo SpA and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co Ltd (JAIEC) to form a new joint venture company for the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), each holding a one-third shareholding, subject to regulatory approvals.

Post-balance-sheet event · November 2024

Mobilisation arrangement entered into with ASC SSN-AUKUS Pty Ltd and the Australian Submarine Agency to develop detailed plans, schedules and workforce initiatives for the Australian build programme of SSN-AUKUS submarines.

Post-balance-sheet event · December 2024

Sale of 49% share in Turkish joint venture FNSS to partner Nurol Holdings completed.

Post-balance-sheet event · December 2024

Sale of the Anniston Forge and Spares business in Alabama, US completed.

Compliance signals

What the compliance pass surfaced

TCO & Human Rights Sanctions Matches — Geoghegan

Christopher Vincent Geoghegan returns two separate sanctions flags across the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 and a Transnational Criminal Organisation regime, warranting urgent manual verification.

Severity · critical

ISIL/Al-Qaeda Partial Name Matches

Three individuals (Cockburn, Inglis, Symon) matched on the shared middle name 'George' against the ISIL/Al-Qaeda UN Sanctions regime at 0.85 confidence, likely false positives but requiring documented clearance.

Severity · high

PEP Identified — Inglis, Andrew George

Andrew George Inglis matches a Liberal Democrat MP at 0.9 confidence, triggering enhanced due diligence obligations under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017.

Severity · high

Outstanding Secured Charges

Four outstanding or part-satisfied charges are registered at Companies House, indicating significant secured financial obligations that should be assessed for counterparty exposure.

Severity · high

High Director Turnover

57 resigned directors against 12 active represents an elevated attrition ratio that should be reviewed for patterns of governance instability or regulatory-driven departures.

Severity · medium

Ownership pattern

What the ownership structure suggests

Family Wealth · Directors and PSCs share a single family-office address.

What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.

Internal data-quality signals · expand

These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.

Financial completeness 65
Compliance signals 50
Operational disclosure 72
Data confidence 70

04 · Market

Sector and benchmarks

SIC2007 · cohort metrics

Industry classification

Manufacturing

Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 4 codes: 25400, 29100, 30110, 30300.

Sector context · thin

This filing doesn't carry segment reporting, concentration analysis, or a stated-priorities block — typical for small / micro-entity filings where the disclosure threshold is lower. The SIC classification above is the load-bearing market signal.

05 · People

The people behind the company

12 directors · 0 PSCs · 27.8m UK appointments cross-referenced

Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.

Directors analysed 11 1 corporate · cross-checked against 27.8m records
Avg failure rate 25.0% share of prior companies that went into liquidation / dissolution
Max concurrent boards 4 most active director sits on 4 boards · 1.4 avg
Phoenix signals 0 no director linked to dissolved-and-restarted companies

Each director, individually

Career history + cross-references

Role Director Career boards Concurrent Prior-failure rate Joined Other UK boards
Director · active
MR Nicholas John Anderson British · United Kingdom
1 2020-11-01
Director · active
Thomas Arnold Arseneault American · United States
1 2020-04-01
Director · active
MS Nicole Weyerhaeuser Piasecki American · United States
1 2019-06-01
Director · active
MR Angus George Cockburn British · Scotland
1 2023-11-06
Director · active
MR Stephen Thomas Pearce Australian · United Kingdom
2 2 2019-06-01
Director · active
MS Crystal Ashby American · United States
1 2021-09-01
Director · active
DR Jane Veronica Griffiths British · United Kingdom
1 2020-04-01
Director · active
MR Bradley Madsen Greve American · United Kingdom
1 2020-04-01
Director · active
MR Charles Nicholas Woodburn British · United Kingdom
2 2 2016-05-09

Co-director network

Who sits on other UK boards alongside these directors

People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.

MR Miles Alexander Lyell Kirby 4 career appointments 2 shared boards
DR Ewan Mckinnon Kirk 4 career appointments · 1 failed · 25.0% failure rate 1 shared board
MR Charles Nicholas Woodburn 2 career appointments 1 shared board
MR Stephen Thomas Pearce 2 career appointments 1 shared board
MS Nicole Weyerhaeuser Piasecki 1 career appointment 1 shared board
MR Bradley Madsen Greve 1 career appointment 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

MR Nicholas John Anderson 1 career appointment 1 shared board
MR Anthony Martin O'neill 1 career appointment 1 shared board

Shared-board names aren't surfaced for this report yet — they live in the underlying network appointments but haven't been promoted to parse_meta. Email support and we'll add them on request.

MR Anthony Clarke 39 career appointments 1 shared board
MR John Allan Whittaker 3 career appointments · 2 failed · 66.7% failure rate 1 shared board
+ Show the 60 resigned officers

Historical board

Resigned network

Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.

1999

Stuart Paul Carroll

Secretary Served 1996 → 1999
2024

David Stanley Parkes

Secretary Served 1999 → 2024
1996

Susan Doreen Windridge

Secretary Resigned 1996-11-13
2020

Revathi Advaithi

Director Served 2018 → 2020
2014

Paul Milton Anderson

Director Served 2009 → 2014
1998

Robert Patten Bauman

Director Served 1994 → 1998
2003

Robin Adair, Sir Biggam

Director Served 1994 → 2003
2007

Susan Joyce, Professor Birley

Director Served 2000 → 2007
1994

James, Lord Blyth Of Rowington

Director Resigned 1994-04-26
2003

Keith Clark Brown

Director Resigned 2003-04-29
1994

John Conway Cahill

Director Resigned 1994-04-26
2023

Roger Martyn, Sir Carr

Director Served 2013 → 2023
2010

Philip Joseph Carroll Jnr

Director Served 2005 → 2010
2007

Ulrich, Doctor Cartellieri

Director Served 1999 → 2007
1992

Brian Cookson

Director Resigned 1992-06-30
2025

Elizabeth Pauline Lucy Corley

Director Served 2016 → 2025
1993

Judson Graham, Sir Day

Director Resigned 1993-09-14
2020

Gerard Joseph Demuro

Director Served 2014 → 2020
2004

Richard Harry Evans

Director Served 1992 → 2004
2022

Carolyn Julie, Dame Fairbairn

Director Served 2021 → 2022
2007

Christopher Vincent Geoghegan

Director Served 2002 → 2007
2000

Peter Oliver, Sir Gershon

Director Served 1999 → 2000
1995

Sydney Gillibrand

Director Resigned 1995-06-30
2019

Harriet Green

Director Served 2010 → 2019
2023

Christopher Montague Grigg

Director Served 2013 → 2023
2002

Ronald Claus, Sir Hampel

Director Resigned 2002-05-31
2012

Michael James Hartnall

Director Served 2003 → 2012
2009

Walter Perry Havenstein

Director Served 2007 → 2009
2005

Thomas Alexander, Lord Hesketh

Director Served 1994 → 2005
1997

Clive Richard, Lord Hollick Of Notting Hill

Director Resigned 1997-05-28
2014

Linda Parker Hudson

Director Served 2009 → 2014
2010

Andrew George Inglis

Director Served 2007 → 2010
2017

Ian Graham, Mr. King

Director Served 2007 → 2017
1997

Robert Leonard Kirk

Director Resigned 1997-04-30
1999

Richard Douglas Lapthorne

Director Served 1992 → 1999
2006

Michael Lester

Director Served 1999 → 2006
2020

Peter John, Mr. Lynas

Director Served 2011 → 2020
2003

Charles Beech Gordon, Sir Masefield

Director Served 1999 → 2003
2013

Peter James, Sir Mason

Director Served 2003 → 2013
2013

Lee Alan Mcintire

Director Served 2011 → 2013
2007

Steven Lewis Mogford

Director Served 2000 → 2007
1992

Harold Raymond Mould

Director Resigned 1992-08-14
2014

Richard Lake, Sir Olver

Director Served 2004 → 2014
2006

Michael Denzil Xavier, The Rt Hon Portillo

Director Served 2002 → 2006
2011

Roberto Quarta

Director Served 2005 → 2011
2020

Paula Rosput Reynolds

Director Served 2011 → 2020
2006

Mark Henry Ronald

Director Served 2002 → 2006
2011

George Wilfred Rose

Director Served 1998 → 2011
2020

Nicholas Charles Rose

Director Served 2010 → 2020
2009

Anthony Nigel Russell, Sir Rudd

Director Served 2006 → 2009
1992

Frank Bailey Saundry

Director Resigned 1992-06-30
2004

Paolo Scaroni

Director Served 2000 → 2004
2024

Mark Philip, Lord Sedwill

Director Served 2022 → 2024
1994

George, Lord Simpson

Director Resigned 1994-03-31
2015

Carl George Symon

Director Served 2008 → 2015
2008

Michael John Turner

Director Served 1994 → 2008
2022

Ian Paul Tyler

Director Served 2013 → 2022
2011

Ravi Kant Uppal

Director Served 2008 → 2011
2008

Peter Amory Weinberg

Director Served 2005 → 2008
2002

John Pix Weston

Director Served 1994 → 2002

06 · AI Investigation

Case file open · File no. 01470151 · 18 May 2026 · Trust signal · 62/100 · AI confidence · 92%

BAE Systems is a classic backlog-fortress: £77.

AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 28 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.

Critical
1
Load-bearing signals
Warning
12
Context to the verdict
Structural
15
Supporting facts
Evidence
12
Distinct pages cited

AI Analyst commentary

What the numbers, the board, and the ownership say

Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.

Balance sheet

Fixed assets leapt £6.1bn to £26.4bn in FY2024 — the biggest single-year balance sheet move in the dataset — while net assets grew a more modest 9.8% to £11.8bn. The gap tells you that new liabilities, particularly long-term debt rising to £14bn, are funding part of that investment.

Board

15 directors currently registered at Companies House — large board typical of a listed FTSE 100 defence prime. Nicholas Anderson also directs Gestra UK Limited — a minor cross-directorship with no obvious conflict at this scale.

Ownership

BAE Systems plc is publicly listed — no single controlling shareholder; institutional ownership is the norm for a company of this size. No PSC registered — consistent with widely-held listed plc structure where no individual holds 25%+ of shares.

Case files · Chapter dossier

The investigation, chapter by chapter

Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.

Chapter 01

Revenue Surge, Margin Squeeze

Turnover jumped £3.2bn in a single year, but operating margins told a different story.

Turnover vs Profit before tax

FY2023 Turnover £23.1bn
FY2024 Turnover £26.3bn

A 14% revenue jump with only a 4% rise in operating profit means the extra work cost more than it earned in margin terms. Pre-tax profit effectively flatlined — up just £6m on a £23bn base. Growth at scale doesn't automatically mean proportionate returns.

Source · Profit & Loss Account, FY2023 vs FY2024

Chapter 02

The Investing Spike

Investing cash outflows grew by 874% in one year — a move that dwarfs every other line in the cash flow statement.

-874%
Investing cash outflow FY2023: -£541m FY2024: -£5.3bn

In FY2023, BAE spent £541m on investing activities. In FY2024, that figure became £5.269bn. Fixed assets simultaneously rose £6.1bn to £26.4bn. Something large was acquired or built — the brief does not specify what, and readers should verify the detail in the filed accounts.

Source · Cash Flow Statement & Balance Sheet, FY2024

Chapter 03

Funding the Expansion

Cash fell and long-term liabilities surged as the company reached for external money to support its investment programme.

£3.4bn Cash (FY2024)
vs
£14.0bn Long-term liabilities (FY2024)

Cash on hand dropped £689m to £3.378bn while long-term liabilities rose £3.625bn to £14.023bn — a 35% increase. Financing cash flipped from an outflow of £2.188bn to an inflow of £695m, signalling new borrowing or issuance. A charge was satisfied in March 2025, per Companies House filing MR04.

Source · Balance Sheet FY2024; Cash Flow Statement FY2024; Companies House filing MR04, 2025-03-01

Chapter 04

Fixed Assets vs Net Assets

The asset base expanded dramatically, but equity kept pace — just.

+30%
Fixed assets FY2023: £20.3bn FY2024: £26.4bn

Fixed assets rose 30% to £26.4bn while net assets grew a more modest 10% to £11.777bn. Current liabilities also climbed 13% to £12.342bn, slightly outpacing the flat current asset base of £11.753bn. The balance sheet is heavier on both sides than it was twelve months ago.

Source · Balance Sheet, FY2023 vs FY2024

Chapter 05

Governance and Ownership

No single shareholder owns more than 25% — and the board spans three nationalities.

May 2016 Woodburn appointed — longest-serving director
Jun 2019 Pearce (AU) & Piasecki (US) join
Nov 2023 Cockburn appointed
Feb 2026 Pettigrew — most recent appointment

There is no Person of Significant Control on record, consistent with a widely held FTSE-listed group. Twelve directors sit on the board: seven British, four American, one Australian. Charles Woodburn has held the CEO role since 2016; the most recent appointment, John Pettigrew, joined in February 2026 per Companies House records.

Source · Companies House PSC register; Director appointments register

Chapter 06

Trust Score and Compliance Note

A 62/100 Verif-AI TrustScore flags one dimension that lags the others.

50% Compliance score
vs
72% Operational score

The Compliance dimension scores 50/100 — the lowest of the four Verif-AI dimensions and 22 points below Operational (72/100). Financial scores 65/100. The brief also does not confirm filing currency with certainty; readers should check the denomination in the original accounts before relying on any absolute figure.

Source · Verif-AI TrustScore model; CURRENCY field in filing brief

Cross-signal intelligence

AI correlations across the filing

Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.

The £5.269bn investing outflow in [chapter 2] directly explains the 30% jump in fixed assets visible in [chapter 4] — the money left the cash account and landed on the balance sheet as long-lived assets.

The financing cash flip from −£2.188bn to +£695m in [chapter 3] appears sized to partially offset the cash drain caused by the investing surge in [chapter 2], suggesting the capital programme was planned alongside new external funding.

↔ Cross-reference

The Compliance TrustScore of 50/100 flagged in [chapter 6] sits alongside the unconfirmed currency denomination — two separate verification gaps that both point toward the same check: reading the original filed accounts directly before acting on any figure.

Deep signals

Buried in the filing

Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.

01

Revenue surged 14% but profit grew only 0.3% — costs are absorbing the growth

Consistent with a business in a heavy investment and programme ramp-up phase — where new contracts require significant upfront staffing, supply chain, and overhead costs before the full margin benefit materialises. The filing does not specify the exact cost drivers.

02

Fixed assets rose £6.1bn in a single year — the largest balance sheet move in eight years

The scale and timing appear consistent with a significant acquisition or a portfolio of long-term programme investments being capitalised simultaneously, financed partly by new long-term debt. The filing does not disclose the specific assets acquired.

03

Trade creditors of £6.4bn — the largest in the eight-year dataset

A rising trade creditor balance alongside strong revenue growth is consistent with a growing supply chain rather than payment delays. However, at a creditor days figure of -89 days (indicating the metric is driven by contract advance payments rather than standard trade terms), the headline creditor figure requires careful interpretation.

Forensic investigation · 28 signals

Three specialist agents, working in parallel

Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.

01

Segmental Analysis

US is the single biggest market at 48% of group revenue

US revenue was £12,559m in 2024 (2023: £10,700m), representing 47.7% of total group revenue of £26,312m. Growth was £1,859m or 17.4% year-on-year.

p.154 · 7 more from this specialist

02

Strategic KPIs

Order backlog hits record £77.8bn — 8 years of sales visibility

Order backlog rose £8.0bn (11.5%) to £77.8bn in 2024, from £69.8bn in 2023.

p.4 · 9 more from this specialist

03

Capital Structure & Borrowings

Net debt rose sharply after the Ball Aerospace buy

Net debt (excluding lease liabilities) is £4.9bn, up £3.9bn on the prior year, mainly due to the £4.4bn Ball Aerospace acquisition funded partly by new debt

p.2 · 9 more from this specialist

+ Show all 28 specialist findings

Segmental Analysis (8)

01

US is the single biggest market at 48% of group revenue

US revenue was £12,559m in 2024 (2023: £10,700m), representing 47.7% of total group revenue of £26,312m. Growth was £1,859m or 17.4% year-on-year.

Why it matters: Nearly half the group's income comes from one country, so any change in US defence spending or policy could have a big impact on the whole business.

p.154 critical conf 97%

02

Electronic Systems grew revenue by 32% — the fastest growing segment

Electronic Systems revenue rose from £5,456m in 2023 to £7,186m in 2024, a jump of £1,730m or 31.7%. This includes the newly acquired SMS business.

Why it matters: This segment is growing very fast, partly because of the SMS acquisition, and is now the second largest by revenue — investors need to know how much of the growth is from buying new businesses versus organic growth.

p.154 important conf 95%

03

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the fourth largest geography at 11% of revenue

Saudi Arabia revenue was £2,892m in 2024 (2023: £2,687m), representing 11.0% of group revenue. Growth was £205m or 7.6%.

Why it matters: Saudi Arabia is a significant market and any political or regulatory change affecting defence exports to that country could affect over one-tenth of group income.

p.154 important conf 95%

04

Segmental operating profit not separately disclosed in the segmental note

Note 2 provides revenue and sales by segment and geography, but does not separately disclose operating profit per segment. Underlying EBIT by segment is referenced in the financial review narrative (pages 32–33) but not as a formal table in the segmental note.

Why it matters: Without segment-level profit figures in the note itself, it is harder to compare profit margins across divisions or spot which segments are most or least profitable from the statutory accounts alone.

p.154 important conf 90%

05

Air segment is the largest by revenue at 26% of group total

Air revenue was £6,880m in 2024 (2023: £6,517m), representing 26.1% of total group revenue. Sales including equity-accounted investments were £8,519m (2023: £8,058m).

Why it matters: The Air segment, including MBDA and Saudi Arabia work, is the largest single business — its performance sets the tone for the whole group.

p.154 useful conf 96%

06

Maritime grew 11% with strong Australian and submarine contributions

Maritime revenue grew from £5,391m in 2023 to £6,002m in 2024, an increase of £611m or 11.3%. Sales were £6,187m (2023: £5,536m).

Why it matters: Maritime is the third largest segment and its steady growth, driven by the Hunter Class frigate programme in Australia and UK submarines, shows the business is winning long-term government contracts.

p.154 useful conf 95%

07

Cyber & Intelligence is the smallest segment with modest 3.9% growth

Cyber & Intelligence revenue was £2,411m in 2024 (2023: £2,321m), a rise of £90m or 3.9%. No equity-accounted investment sales are included in this segment.

Why it matters: This is the slowest-growing part of the business; at only 9% of group revenue it is not yet big enough to move the needle, but slow growth compared to other segments may prompt questions about strategy.

p.154 useful conf 95%

08

UK revenue grew 15% but remains less than a third of the group

UK revenue was £7,039m in 2024 (2023: £6,102m), an increase of £937m or 15.4%. The UK represents 26.7% of group revenue.

Why it matters: Although BAE Systems is a UK-headquartered company, the US generates far more revenue than the UK, showing the business is much more global than its home base might suggest.

p.154 useful conf 95%

Strategic KPIs (10)

01

Order backlog hits record £77.8bn — 8 years of sales visibility

Order backlog rose £8.0bn (11.5%) to £77.8bn in 2024, from £69.8bn in 2023.

Why it matters: A record backlog means the company has years of work already contracted, so there is very low risk of a sudden revenue collapse — reassuring for anyone doing business with it.

p.4 important conf 98%

02

Sales up 14% to £28.3bn — fastest growth in recent years

Sales rose from £25.3bn in 2023 to £28.3bn in 2024, a 14% increase on a constant currency basis.

Why it matters: Double-digit sales growth shows strong demand from government defence customers and confirms the company is winning and executing contracts at pace.

p.4 important conf 98%

03

Underlying EBIT up 14% to £3,015m — profit growing as fast as sales

Underlying EBIT grew from £2,682m in 2023 to £3,015m in 2024, a 14% rise on a constant currency basis.

Why it matters: Profit growing at the same rate as sales means the company is not having to spend more to win each extra pound of revenue — a healthy sign for trading partners.

p.4 important conf 97%

04

Capital expenditure more than doubled to £1.0bn

Capital expenditure rose from £0.8bn in 2023 to £1.0bn in 2024, a 25% increase, focused on maritime, munitions, combat vehicles and electronics.

Why it matters: A big step-up in investment in factories and facilities signals the company is building capacity to deliver its record backlog — good for long-term supply reliability.

p.8, p.11 important conf 95%

05

Safety record worsened — recordable accident rate up 8% in 2024

The recordable accident rate rose from 424 to 459 per 100,000 employees, and major injuries rose from 40 to 47, an 18% increase.

Why it matters: A worsening safety record is a risk flag for any organisation thinking of working with this company, as it can lead to regulatory scrutiny and lost productivity.

p.18 important conf 96%

06

Underlying EPS up 10% to 68.5p — shareholders earning more per share

Underlying earnings per share rose from 63.2p in 2023 to 68.5p in 2024, a 10% increase on a constant currency basis.

Why it matters: Rising earnings per share shows the company is generating more profit for each share owned, which builds investor confidence and supports a stable, growing company.

p.4 important conf 97%

07

Operating margin broadly stable at around 10% (IFRS basis)

IFRS operating profit was £2,685m on revenue of £26.3bn, implying an operating margin of approximately 10.2%, versus 11.1% in 2023 (£2,573m on £23.1bn).

Why it matters: A steady double-digit margin in defence manufacturing shows the company can keep making a good profit even as it ramps up spending on people, facilities and R&D.

p.4 useful conf 85%

08

Free cash flow dipped slightly to £2,505m but still very strong

Free cash flow fell £88m (3.4%) from £2,593m in 2023 to £2,505m in 2024, even after a step-up in capital investment.

Why it matters: The company is generating large amounts of real cash, which means it can pay suppliers promptly and invest in growth without relying heavily on borrowing.

p.4, p.11 useful conf 97%

09

Order intake fell £4.0bn to £33.7bn — still well above annual sales

Order intake dropped from £37.7bn in 2023 to £33.7bn in 2024, a 10.6% decrease, though it still exceeds annual sales by around 19%.

Why it matters: Intake is still comfortably above sales, meaning the backlog keeps growing, but the drop is worth watching to see if demand momentum is slowing.

p.4 useful conf 96%

10

Workforce grew 8% to 107,400 — including 5,200 from Ball Aerospace

Total employees increased from roughly 99,800 to 107,400 in 2024, a net rise of 7,600, partly driven by the Ball Aerospace acquisition.

Why it matters: A fast-growing headcount shows the company is scaling up to meet demand, but also increases the challenge of managing costs and keeping productivity high.

p.6, p.15 useful conf 97%

Capital Structure & Borrowings (10)

01

Net debt rose sharply after the Ball Aerospace buy

Net debt (excluding lease liabilities) is £4.9bn, up £3.9bn on the prior year, mainly due to the £4.4bn Ball Aerospace acquisition funded partly by new debt

Why it matters: The company took on a lot more debt in one year to fund its biggest ever acquisition, so leverage is higher than it was, though still manageable given strong cash generation.

p.2 important conf 90%

02

Dividends paid to shareholders were £937m in 2024

The company paid £937m in dividends during 2024 (2023: part of £1,418m total returns). The board recommended a 20.6p final dividend, taking the full-year dividend to 33.0p, a 10% increase on 2023.

Why it matters: Growing dividends signal management confidence in future earnings, and a 10% rise shows the business is sharing its success with shareholders.

p.3, p.7 important conf 90%

03

Share buybacks of £555m completed in 2024

The company repurchased £555m of its own shares during 2024 (2023: £561m), returning a combined £1,492m to shareholders alongside dividends

Why it matters: Buybacks reduce the number of shares in issue, which tends to increase earnings per share, and signals that management believes the shares are good value.

p.3, p.7 important conf 90%

04

Interest cover is comfortable at around 5.5x

Operating profit £2,685m divided by finance costs £488m gives interest cover of approximately 5.5x

Why it matters: The company earns more than five times what it pays in interest, so there is a large buffer before debt becomes a problem.

p.7 useful conf 85%

05

Cash balance is strong at £3.4bn

The group ended 2024 with a cash position of £3.4bn (£3,378m per headline figures)

Why it matters: A large cash buffer means the company can meet near-term payments and obligations without needing to borrow more straight away.

p.2 useful conf 95%

06

Three-year free cash flow exceeds £7bn, showing strong cash generation

Cumulative free cash flow over the three years to end-2024 was over £7.0bn, with £2.5bn delivered in 2024 alone

Why it matters: Strong free cash flow means the company can pay dividends, buy back shares, and reduce debt without relying on external funding.

p.2, p.3 useful conf 90%

07

IFRS 16 lease liabilities add to total debt load

Lease depreciation was £219m and lease interest £73m in 2024, implying a significant lease liability on the balance sheet. Long-term liabilities total £14,023m per headline figures.

Why it matters: Lease obligations are fixed costs that must be paid, so they add to the total amount the company owes even though they do not appear as traditional bank debt.

p.17 useful conf 70%

08

Currency risk is actively hedged out to 2034

The group holds foreign currency forward contracts with notional values of £15,019m purchased and £15,591m sold, with maturities up to 2034

Why it matters: Most of BAE's revenues are in US dollars, euros, and Australian dollars, so hedging protects profit margins from sudden swings in exchange rates.

p.20 useful conf 90%

09

Capital expenditure topped £1bn, funded from operating cash

Capital expenditure rose to over £1.0bn in 2024, up from 2023 levels, focused on maritime, munitions, combat vehicles and electronics

Why it matters: Rising capex means the company is investing heavily in its facilities, which should support future growth but also uses cash that could otherwise reduce debt.

p.2 useful conf 85%

10

No covenant breach or waiver disclosed

The annual report pages reviewed contain no mention of any loan limit breach, waiver, or request to change borrowing conditions

Why it matters: No covenant problems means lenders are not putting pressure on the company and normal trading can continue without restrictions.

useful conf 75%

Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture

Every figure the specialists extracted

Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.

Segmental analysis

Revenue & operating profit by business division

Segment Revenue (latest) Operating profit Rev YoY
Electronic Systems €7.2bn +31.7%
Platforms & Services €4.3bn +13.1%
Air €6.9bn +5.6%
Maritime €6.0bn +11.3%
Cyber & Intelligence €2.4bn +3.9%
HQ €24m +140.0%
UK €7.0bn +15.4%
Europe (excluding UK) €1.7bn +13.0%
US €12.6bn +17.4%
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia €2.9bn +7.6%
Australia €1.2bn +22.8%
Other geographies €931m -16.4%

Top-segment revenue concentration: 47.7% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L

Strategic KPIs

6 flagship metrics · 9 supporting

Sales (Group-defined)
28300 £m
+11.86% YoY
Underlying EBIT
3015 £m
+12.41% YoY
Underlying EPS
68.5 pence
+8.39% YoY
Free Cash Flow
2505 £m
-3.39% YoY
Order Intake
33700 £m
-10.61% YoY
Order Backlog
77800 £m
+11.46% YoY
+ Show 9 supporting KPIs
Revenue (IFRS)
26300
+13.85% YoY
Operating Profit (IFRS)
2685
+4.35% YoY
Operating Margin (IFRS, derived)
10.2%
-8.11% YoY
Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities
3925
+4.39% YoY
Capital Expenditure
1000
+25.0% YoY
Total Employees
107400
+7.62% YoY
Recordable Accident Rate
459
+8.25% YoY
Dividend Per Share
33.0
+10.0% YoY
Basic EPS (IFRS)
64.9
+5.87% YoY

Capital structure

Debt, cover, and dividend posture

Net debt
£4.9bn
Interest cover
5.5×

Management questions · Open inquiry

What management would need to answer next

Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.

Verification gaps

What the filings don't disclose

High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.

Segmental operating profit is not formally tabled in the statutory segmental note (Note 2) — per-division margin analysis relies on narrative disclosures rather than audited line items, which limits comparability and independent verification.

07 · Documents

The filing trail

100 filings · Companies House

Filing distribution

SH03
49%
49
SH04
26%
26
SH06
17%
17
CS01
2
AA
1
AP01
1
MA
1
MR04
1
RESOLUTIONS
1
TM01
1

Latest filings

2026-04-07 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
2026-04-07 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
2026-04-07 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
2026-04-02 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
2026-03-10 AP01 Appoint person director company with name date
2026-01-26 SH04 Capital sale or transfer treasury shares with date currency capital figure
2026-01-21 TM01 Termination director company with name termination date
2025-12-09 SH06 Capital cancellation shares
2025-12-09 SH03 Capital return purchase own shares
2025-12-09 SH03 Capital return purchase own shares
2025-12-09 SH03 Capital return purchase own shares
2025-12-09 SH03 Capital return purchase own shares

Catalyst timeline

Filing pattern + upcoming windows

100 filings · 2024 → 2026
Accounts Officers Capital Resolutions Other
2024 2025 2026 2027 Accounts due Confirmation due
2026Annual accounts

Next annual accounts due

Due at Companies House by 2026-06-30 for the period ending 2025-12-31.

2026Confirmation

Next confirmation statement due

Annual confirmation due by 2026-10-13 (made up to 2026-09-29).

Final chapter — The verdict

The Verdict

62 GOOD TRUST
Verif-AI Synthesis

Good Trust

The world's largest defence prime is investing at pace — the balance sheet is stretching, the margins are thinning, and the bet is that tomorrow's contracts will justify today's costs.

FY2024 accounts

Signal Radar

How the score breaks down

Financial completeness 65/100
Operational disclosure 72/100
Compliance signals 50/100
Data confidence 70/100

Decisive findings

What decided this verdict

The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.

01

US is the single biggest market at 48% of group revenue

US revenue was £12,559m in 2024 (2023: £10,700m), representing 47.7% of total group revenue of £26,312m. Growth was £1,859m or 17.4% year-on-year.

Why it matters: Nearly half the group's income comes from one country, so any change in US defence spending or policy could have a big impact on the whole business.

p.154

09 · Verification

How we know

100 filings · 11 directors · — pages

What we read

Companies House filings

Total filings 100 2024 → 2026
Accounts filings 1 audited financial statements
Officer events 2 appointments + terminations
Capital events 92 share allotments + buybacks

Who we cross-checked

UK director appointment network

Directors verified 11 incl. 1 corporate officer
Records cross-referenced 27.8m UK appointments dataset
Avg failure rate 25.0% across prior appointments
Phoenix scan 0 directors flagged

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO sanctions screen Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Status · Active

Steps we ran

How the report was assembled

Pages read PDF pages analysed
Steps run 0 0 failed · 0 succeeded
AI checks 3 independent reviews
Years analysed 8 audited filings trended

Each step in detail

segmental strategic kpis capital structure

Limits and caveats

What this report doesn't claim

01

Peer benchmarks

No sector-cohort comparison was generated for this filing — the benchmarking pipeline either skipped this SIC code or this report predates that block.

02

Persons with significant control

No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.

03

Principal risks register

The filed accounts did not surface a structured principal-risks register, or one was not extracted by the parser. Small / micro-entity filings are not required to disclose this.

Plain-English glossary · 9 terms
Net Assets
Everything the company owns, minus everything it owes. Think of it as the company's net worth.
In this filing: BAE Systems' net assets are £11.8bn — a large cushion, though it includes £6.1bn of intangibles and lease assets that can't easily be turned into cash.
Profit Before Tax (PBT)
The profit the company made before paying tax — the number that shows whether the core business is making money.
In this filing: PBT was £2.33bn in FY2024, barely up on FY2023's £2.33bn despite revenue growing 14% — a sign that costs are rising faster than sales.
Current Liabilities
Bills, loans, and money owed to suppliers that must be paid within the next 12 months.
In this filing: BAE Systems owes £12.3bn within 12 months — up £1.4bn on the prior year — against £3.4bn of cash on hand.
Fixed Assets
Long-term assets the company owns and uses over many years — factories, equipment, patents, and right-of-use leases.
In this filing: Fixed assets jumped from £20.3bn to £26.4bn in one year — a £6.1bn increase that reflects major investment in new programmes and acquisitions.
Debtor Days
How long, on average, it takes customers to pay after being invoiced. Longer is worse for cash flow.
In this filing: At 103 days, BAE's customers take over three months to pay — typical for government defence contracts but it ties up a lot of cash.
Working Capital Gap
The cash a business needs to bridge the gap between paying its own bills and collecting money from customers.
In this filing: BAE Systems pays suppliers 89 days before it collects from customers — a 192-day gap that requires £13.8bn of ongoing financing to bridge.
Cash Conversion
How much of the company's accounting profit turns into actual cash it can spend. Over 100% means it collects more cash than profit suggests.
In this filing: At 192.3%, BAE collects cash faster than it books profit — in practice, this means working capital movements are generating extra cash inflows.
Asset Fragility
The proportion of assets that are intangible (like patents or goodwill) or lease-based — things that are hard to sell if the company gets into trouble.
In this filing: 43.8% of BAE's total assets fall into this category — meaning less than 57% of the asset base is 'hard' physical assets like land, buildings, and equipment.
Shareholders' Funds
The total amount that belongs to shareholders after all debts are paid — broadly the same as net assets for most companies.
In this filing: Shareholders' funds stand at £11.6bn — up from £10.6bn — meaning the equity owners' stake in the business has grown by about £1bn this year.