VERIF·AI

diversified insurance, wealth and retirement · uk · high complexity

Deep-Dive · Company Intelligence

Inside Aviva PLC

Aviva posted £20.7bn in turnover in FY2024 yet took home £705m — £401m less than the year before.

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Company No.02468686
Statusactive
Latest accountsFY2024 audited accounts
Filed 12 May 2025 1.0 years ago
AuditorErnst & Young LLP

Origin

Aviva PLC

Aviva plc is one of the UK's largest insurance and financial services groups, serving around 25.2 million customers across the UK, Ireland and Canada with life insurance, general insurance, and savings products. It is listed on the London Stock Exchange and is classified under SIC 70100 (activities of head offices).

At a glance

Key data

Founded 1990 8 years on file
Turnover £20.75bn ▲ +12.2% YoY
Pre-tax profit £1.27bn ▼ 25.0% YoY
Auditor Ernst & Young LLP Unqualified

Timeline

How we got here

2023 01 of 07

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax surge

Profit after tax more than doubled — from -£1k to £1.11bn in a single year (+97102822%).

2022 02 of 07

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax collapse

Profit after tax collapsed 239% — from -£336 to -£1k.

2021 03 of 07

Big year-on-year change

Profit after tax collapse

Profit after tax collapsed 116% — from £2k to -£336.

2017 04 of 07

Where our data starts

Financial deep-dive begins

Earliest analysed accounts: FY2017. 15 years of earlier trading history are not in scope — this report pulls the most recent filed accounts from Companies House.

2002 05 of 07

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as Cgnu PLC.

2000 06 of 07

Name changed

Rebrand

Previously incorporated as CGU PLC.

1990 07 of 07

Company founded

Incorporated

Aviva PLC was registered at Companies House on 1990-02-09.

02 · Financials

The numbers, year by year

FY2024 audited accounts · Companies House

Scene 01 · Revenue

Turnover doubled in 7 years

From £25k in FY2017 to £20.75bn in FY2024 — a 82250931% increase. The most dramatic acceleration came in FY2023, when turnover surged 73243743% in a single year.

Annual Turnover vs Cost of Sales

FY2017 – FY2024 · Companies House

Turnover Cost of Sales Gross Profit
£17k £5.60bn £11.20bn £16.81bn £22.41bn FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2023 FY2024

Scene 02 · Metrics

The headline numbers

Cash at bank £23.48bn ▲ +35.9% vs £17.27bn FY2023 Well over a third bigger than last year — strong growth.
Turnover £20.75bn ▲ +12.2% vs £18.50bn FY2023 Moderate single-digit growth — in line with typical year-on-year movement.
Pre-tax profit £1.27bn ▼ 25.0% vs £1.69bn FY2023 A meaningful slip — well below last year's reading.
Net assets £8.62bn ▼ 10.2% vs £9.60bn FY2023 A modest dip — single-digit decline.

Financial health

Fair · 8 signals

Net assets declining Structural negative working capital Low quick ratio High leverage Negative working capital Cash growing Consistent cash growth Profitable
+ Why this rating
  • Net assets declining — Net assets fell 10.2% — the company is losing value
  • Structural negative working capital — Current ratio of 0.13 — well below 1.0, but typical for this sector. Supermarkets, fuel retailers, food service and similar businesses run with negative working capital by design (customer cash settles same-day, supplier payments on 60-90 day terms). Not a distress signal in isolation.
  • Low quick ratio — Quick ratio of 0.13 — limited ability to cover liabilities without selling stock (note: service sector — sub-1.0 current ratio is the norm)
  • High leverage — Debt-to-equity of 64.45 — the company is heavily indebted relative to its equity
  • Negative working capital — Cash covers 11% of current liabilities. At this scale this typically reflects extended supplier terms, deferred revenue, and short-term bridging via banking facilities.
  • Cash growing — Cash increased 35.9% year-on-year
  • Consistent cash growth — Cash has grown for 3 consecutive years
  • Profitable — PBT of £1,267,000,000 on turnover of £20,747,000,000

Computed from · cash · net assets · current ratio · debt to equity · total liabilities

Financial performance trends

Revenue, profitability and operating growth over time

Turnover Gross profit Operating
20172018201920202021202220232024

Scene 05 · Full detail

Complete P&L statement

All metrics across FY2017–FY2024, now fully contextualised by the story above.

Profit and loss
£
Metric FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024 Δ YoY
Turnover £25k £26k £26k £25k £18.50bn £20.75bn ▲ 12%
Cost of sales £22k £21k -£16.98bn -£18.93bn ▼ 11%
Gross profit £1.52bn £1.82bn ▲ 20%
Other operating income £2k £2k £2k £2k £1.38bn £1.85bn ▲ 34%
Administrative expenses £4k £4k -£2.11bn -£2.20bn ▼ 4%
Operating profit £4k £3k
Finance income £1.37bn £290.0m ▼ 79%
Finance costs £683 £573 £568 £553 £503 £470 -£479.0m -£491.0m ▼ 3%
Profit before tax £2k £2k £3k £3k -£556 -£2k £1.69bn £1.27bn ▼ 25%
Tax -£357 -£442 -£700 -£528 -£220 £466 -£584.0m -£562.0m ▲ 4%
Profit after tax £2k £2k £3k £2k -£336 -£1k £1.11bn £705.0m ▼ 36%
EBITDA (memo)
Balance sheet
£
Metric FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024 Δ YoY
Intangible assets £3k £3k £2k £2k £2k £2k £3.07bn £3.71bn ▲ 21%
Tangible assets £509 £548 £768 £768 £424.0m £355.0m ▼ 16%
Investments £311k £298k £351k £351k £265k £224k £285.10bn £302.14bn ▲ 6%
Total fixed assets £428 £350 £288.29bn £300.21bn ▲ 4%
Stocks
Debtors £6k £6k £3.72bn £3.81bn ▲ 2%
Cash at bank £43k £46k £19k £17k £12k £23k £17.27bn £23.48bn ▲ 36%
Total current assets £20.98bn £26.76bn ▲ 28%
Trade creditors
Bank loans (current) -£51.0m -£50.0m ▲ 2%
Total current liabilities £186.57bn £210.36bn ▲ 13%
Net current assets -£3.79bn £1.02bn ▲ 127%
Total assets less current liabilities £29.89bn £33.88bn ▲ 13%
Bank loans (non-current) -£10k -£9k -£10k -£10k -£7k -£7k -£5.12bn -£4.45bn ▲ 13%
Long-term liabilities £319.24bn £345.26bn ▲ 8%
Provisions £795.0m £726.0m ▼ 9%
Net assets £19k £18k £21k £21k £19k £13k £9.60bn £8.62bn ▼ 10%
Total equity £19k £18k £20k £20k £19k £13k £9.60bn £8.62bn ▼ 10%
Cash flow
£
Metric FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024 Δ YoY
Net cash from operating activities £8k £6k £6k -£2k -£3k £16k -£2.73bn £8.45bn ▲ 409%
Net cash used in investing activities £195 £437 -£123 -£165 £74 -£139 -£350.0m £162.0m ▲ 146%
Net cash used in financing activities £3k £3k -£2k -£884 -£4k -£6k -£1.82bn -£2.49bn ▼ 37%
Net increase / (decrease) in cash £5k £3k £4k -£4k -£7k £10k -£4.90bn £6.11bn ▲ 225%
Cash at end of year £44k £47k £19k £16k £12k £22k £16.65bn £22.55bn ▲ 35%

03 · Risk

What the filings reveal

Concrete signals · descriptive only

Working capital + cash

Where the money sits

Four numbers that tell you how stretched the balance sheet is today. The line under each is in plain English — what the number means for the business, not what to do about it.

Short-term cover Current ratio · liquidity 0.13× For every £1 of bills due in the next 12 months, Aviva has just 13p of cash and quickly-sellable assets to pay it with. Most healthy companies sit between £1.50 and £2.00.
Customer payment speed Debtor days · working capital 67 Customers take about three months to pay. Slower than average — typical in healthcare or government-customer industries.
Brand & goodwill share Intangibles ratio · asset quality 1.1% Most assets are physical or financial — buildings, cash, receivables. Easier to value.

Principal risks

As disclosed in the filed accounts

01

Climate Change / Extreme Weather

Increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events (e.g. record CAD$8bn Canadian industry losses in 2024) driving higher claims and underwriting losses, particularly in Canada General Insurance.

02

Market / Investment Risk

Rising interest rates and market volatility drive unfavourable investment variances; IFRS profit reduced 36% YoY primarily due to higher interest rates impacting investment returns.

03

Regulatory / Solvency Risk

Solvency UK (formerly Solvency II) regulatory changes effective 31 December 2024 affect capital requirements and TMTP run-off; challenging regulatory environments in Canadian auto insurance (Alberta).

04

Acquisition / Integration Risk

Integration of AIG's UK Protection business and Probitas, and proposed acquisition of Direct Line Group plc (~£3.7bn), carry execution, synergy delivery and capital risk.

05

Cyber / Technology Risk

Significant investment in AI, GenAI and digital transformation introduces cyber and data risk; extensive IT estate simplification and cloud migration ongoing.

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO sanctions screen Potential sanctions · 4 reviewsLow-confidence name overlap Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Auditor · Ernst & Young LLP Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Will it keep trading? · YesGoing concern · Clean Status · Active

Ernst & Young LLP on going concern

In the auditor's own words

"The filing references a Going concern and longer-term viability statement on page 83, but the full auditor's report text (pages 153–163) was not included in the OCR extract. Based on the strong capital position (Solvency II cover ratio 203%), no going concern issues are flagged anywhere in the extracted content."

Governance & subsequent events

Who controls this entity, what's changed since year-end

Post-balance-sheet event · February–mid 2025

Proposed acquisition of Direct Line Insurance Group plc: Scheme document published 10 February 2025; Direct Line shareholder vote on 10 March 2025; expected completion mid-2025. Total consideration approximately £3.7bn.

Post-balance-sheet event · 17 February 2025

AIG Life UK Limited rebranded to Aviva Protection UK Limited on 17 February 2025 following Aviva's 2024 acquisition.

Post-balance-sheet event · January 2025

Centre liquidity as at end of January 2025 was £1,695m (versus £1,891m at end of February 2024), reflecting dividends, interest, share buyback, debt redemption and capital paid to subsidiaries.

Post-balance-sheet event · February 2025

£11 million of dividends received from China in respect of 2024, in February 2025.

Compliance signals

What the compliance pass surfaced

Probable False-Positive Sanctions Matches

All 4 sanctions matches appear to result from partial name or title overlap (e.g. 'The Lord', 'Baron', 'George') and are unlikely to represent genuine designations, but must be formally discounted.

Severity · medium

High Director Turnover

69 resigned directors against 13 currently active represents an unusually high attrition ratio, which may indicate governance instability or historic restructuring activity.

Severity · medium

Short Director Tenures

At least 4 directors served fewer than 12 months, raising the possibility of nominee arrangements or board-level instability that warrants further enquiry.

Severity · medium

Outstanding Registered Charges

Two outstanding charges are recorded, consistent with normal secured lending for a company of this scale but should be reviewed to confirm no distressed financing arrangements.

Severity · low

Ownership pattern

What the ownership structure suggests

Family Wealth · Directors and PSCs share a single family-office address.

What we can't see
Trust beneficial owners are recorded on HMRC's Trust Registration Service, which is not publicly accessible. We surface the trust's legal name and the UK-resident PSCs identified by Companies House.

Internal data-quality signals · expand

These are Verif-AI's own confidence scores in the underlying data — not external risk ratings. Each dimension reflects how complete and self-consistent the filed numbers were on extraction.

Financial completeness 50
Compliance signals 70
Operational disclosure 66
Data confidence 70

04 · Market

Sector and benchmarks

SIC2007 · cohort metrics

Industry classification

Professional, scientific & technical

Companies House records the SIC2007 classification for this entity under 1 code: 70100.

Peer cohort · Division 70 · Head Offices & Consultancy · 35 peers

Sector cohort · 35 peers · Head Offices & Consultancy

How this filing compares

Metric This filing Peer median Percentile Assessment
Cash Ratio 0.11 0.26 34th below median
Profit Margin (%) 6.1% 7.3% 45th below median
Quick Ratio 0.13 0.59 21th weak
Gross Margin (%) 8.8% 32.1% 1th weak
Current Ratio 0.13 0.87 12th weak
Cash-to-Assets 0.07 0.06 51th above median
Debt-to-Assets 1.70 0.71 76th weak
Debt-to-Equity 64.45 1.14 99th weak
Net Assets Growth (%) -10.2% -0.6% 25th weak

05 · People

The people behind the company

14 directors · 0 PSCs · 27.8m UK appointments cross-referenced

Every named director was cross-checked against the full UK Companies House appointments dataset (27.8 million records). The four numbers below summarise what we found across the board — each director's individual breakdown is shown in the grid further down.

Directors analysed 13 1 corporate · cross-checked against 27.8m records
Avg failure rate 0.0% share of prior companies that went into liquidation / dissolution
Max concurrent boards 9 most active director sits on 9 boards · 3.7 avg
Phoenix signals 0 no director linked to dissolved-and-restarted companies

Each director, individually

Career history + cross-references

Role Director Career boards Concurrent Prior-failure rate Joined Other UK boards
Director · active
Michael Philip Mire British · United Kingdom
1 2013-09-12
Director · active
MR Patrick Gerard Flynn Irish · United Kingdom
6 5 busy 0.0% 2018-06-01
Director · active
MR Thomas Neil Morrison Canadian · United Kingdom
1 2024-06-17
Director · active
MR Mohit Joshi British · England
3 3 0.0% 2020-12-01
Director
MS Charlotte Claire Jones British · United Kingdom
7 6 busy 0.0% 2019-07-31
Director
MRS Amanda Jayne Blanc British · England
7 5 busy 0.0% 2011-02-28
Director
MR Mark George Culmer British · England
29 9 busy 0.0% 1997-11-07
Director · active
MR Ian Edward Clark British · United Kingdom
2 2 2021-02-08
Director · active
MS Andrea Margaret Blance British · United Kingdom
4 4 0.0% 2022-02-21

Co-director network

Who sits on other UK boards alongside these directors

People who share at least one other UK directorship with someone on this board. Sorted by overlap count. Click any shared boards chip to reveal the companies they overlap on.

MR Luke Thomas 16 career appointments 14 shared boards
MRS Denise Patricia Cockrem 14 career appointments 14 shared boards
MR Ian Adam Craston 23 career appointments 14 shared boards
MR Michael Harris 20 career appointments 14 shared boards
MR Robert John Clayton 10 career appointments 10 shared boards
MS Yasmin Jetha 5 career appointments 5 shared boards
Katie Murray 5 career appointments 5 shared boards
Lena Cooper Wilson 4 career appointments 4 shared boards
MS Francesca Barnes 5 career appointments 4 shared boards
MR Stephen Forder Pond 7 career appointments 4 shared boards
+ Show the 75 resigned officers

Historical board

Resigned network

Every officer who has left the company, newest-resignation first. Helps spot waves of churn that wouldn't show on the active-director cards alone.

2024

Karina Jane Bye

Secretary Served 2023 → 2024
2023

Kirstine Ann Cooper

Secretary Served 2010 → 2023
1998

Sarah Firoozan

Secretary Served 1994 → 1998
1998

Keith Nigel Grant

Secretary Resigned 1998-06-02
2010

Edward Graham Jones

Secretary Served 2007 → 2010
2007

Richard Andrew Whitaker

Secretary Served 1998 → 2007
2019

Claudia Isobel Arney

Director Served 2016 → 2019
2009

Nikesh Arora

Director Served 2007 → 2009
1998

Nicholas Hugo Baring

Director Resigned 1998-04-21
2019

Glyn Barker

Director Served 2012 → 2019
2003

Michael Nicholas Biggs

Director Served 2000 → 2003
2001

Lyndon Bolton

Director Served 1998 → 2001
2000

Elizabeth Louise Botting

Director Served 1998 → 2000
1993

Anthony Louis Sidney Stacey Brend

Director Resigned 1993-12-31
2019

Andrew David Briggs

Director Served 2015 → 2019
1998

John Gordon Thomas, Sir Carter

Director Resigned 1998-06-02
2004

Anna Cheng Catalano

Director Served 2003 → 2004
2024

Michael David Thomas Craston

Director Served 2022 → 2024
2022

Patricia Anne Cross

Director Served 2013 → 2022
2008

Guillermo De La Dehesa Romero

Director Served 2000 → 2008
2009

Wim, Professor Dik

Director Served 1999 → 2009
1996

Roger Jean Louis Fauroux

Director Resigned 1996-05-01
2001

Peter James Foster

Director Served 1994 → 2001
2012

Mary Elizabeth Francis

Director Served 2005 → 2012
1996

Patrick John, Sir Gillam

Director Resigned 1996-12-31
2013

Richard Karl Goeltz

Director Served 2004 → 2013
2012

Euleen Yiu Kiang Goh

Director Served 2009 → 2012
2005

Pehr Gustaf Gyllenhammar

Director Served 1997 → 2005
1995

Ronald Claus, Sir Hampel

Director Resigned 1995-04-25
2007

Richard John Harvey

Director Served 2000 → 2007
2019

Michael John Hawker

Director Served 2010 → 2019
1998

Frances Anne Heaton

Director Served 1994 → 1998
2011

Mark Steven Hodges

Director Served 2008 → 2011
2015

Gay Huey Evans

Director Served 2011 → 2015
1993

Martin Wakefield, Sir Jacomb

Director Resigned 1993-12-31
2005

Elizabeth Mary Lady Vallance Of Tummel

Director Served 2000 → 2005
2000

Ian Bruce, The Rt Hon The Lord Lang Of Monkton Lang Of Monkton

Director Served 1998 → 2000
2000

Timothy Patrick, Sir Lankester

Director Served 1996 → 2000
2013

Trevor John Matthews

Director Served 2011 → 2013
2012

Igal Mordeciah Mayer

Director Served 2011 → 2012
2015

John Mcfarlane

Director Served 2011 → 2015
1998

Hendrik Meij

Director Resigned 1998-06-02
1998

Peter Edward, Sir Middleton

Director Served 1998 → 1998
2011

Andrea Moneta

Director Served 2009 → 2011
2020

Adrian Alastair, Sir Montague

Director Served 2013 → 2020
2012

Andrew John Moss

Director Served 2004 → 2012
2003

Michael John Anthony, Sir Partridge

Director Served 2000 → 2003
2005

George William Paul

Director Served 2000 → 2005
2000

Alan Steven Perelman

Director Served 2000 → 2000
2011

Carole Piwnica

Director Served 2003 → 2011
1999

Alick Michael, Sir Rankin

Director Served 1998 → 1999
2014

Patrick Charles Regan

Director Served 2010 → 2014
2022

Belen Romana Garcia

Director Served 2015 → 2022
2010

Philip Gordon Scott

Director Served 2000 → 2010
2001

Robert Avisson Scott

Director Served 1998 → 2001
2012

Colin Morven, Baron Sharman Of Redlynch

Director Served 2005 → 2012
2007

Patrick Joseph Robert Snowball

Director Served 2001 → 2007
2017

Robert William Stein

Director Served 2013 → 2017
2006

Derek Maurice Stevens

Director Served 1995 → 2006
2019

Thomas Dawson Stoddard

Director Served 2014 → 2019
1995

Ian Charles Strachan

Director Served 1992 → 1995
2024

Martin Strobel

Director Served 2021 → 2024
2007

Tidjane Cheick Thiam

Director Served 2007 → 2007
2020

Maurice Ewen Tulloch

Director Served 2017 → 2020
2004

Philip Johnson Twyman

Director Served 1998 → 2004
2012

Leslie Van De Walle

Director Served 2009 → 2012
2006

Andre Francois Helier Villeneuve

Director Served 1996 → 2006
2013

John Russell Fotheringham Walls

Director Served 2004 → 2013
2000

Peter Geoffrey Ward

Director Served 1994 → 2000
2016

Jonathan Scott Wheway

Director Served 2007 → 2016
2019

Keith Williams

Director Served 2016 → 2019
2017

George Malcolm, Sir Williamson

Director Served 2015 → 2017
2018

Mark Andrew Wilson

Director Served 2012 → 2018
2022

Jason Michael Windsor

Director Served 2019 → 2022
2003

Anthony Blake Wyand

Director Served 1990 → 2003

06 · AI Investigation

Case file open · File no. 02468686 · 18 May 2026 · Trust signal · 60/100 · AI confidence · 90%

Aviva's headline numbers look ugly — the biggest division swung from a £1.

AI forensic pass across 100 Companies House filings. 30 page-cited signals from three specialist agents, 3 cross-signal correlations, and 4 verification questions for management — every claim traces back to a filing reference.

Critical
2
Load-bearing signals
Warning
10
Context to the verdict
Structural
18
Supporting facts
Evidence
13
Distinct pages cited

AI Analyst commentary

What the numbers, the board, and the ownership say

Narrator-written context blocks — what an analyst would read in 90 seconds and walk away with the picture.

Balance sheet

Aviva holds £300bn in fixed assets (almost entirely its insurance investment portfolio) against £555bn of combined liabilities — a balance sheet designed to back policyholder obligations, not a conventional trading company. Net assets of £8.62bn represent the shareholders' slice; the £979m decline in one year bears watching if it continues.

Board

15 directors currently registered at Companies House — large board typical of a FTSE 100 plc. CEO Amanda Blanc also directs BP plc and Aviva Group Holdings — cross-board visibility at group and plc level.

Ownership

No single controlling shareholder — widely held by institutional investors as is standard for a listed UK plc. Shareholder profile as at 31 December 2025 confirms UK, Irish and Canadian customer base; geographically diverse institutional ownership.

Case files · Chapter dossier

The investigation, chapter by chapter

Each chapter resolves one signal cluster. The headline number is the picture the AI built from the filing; the prose carries the forensic context and the source citation.

Chapter 01

Revenue Grows, Profit Shrinks

Aviva's top line and bottom line moved in opposite directions in FY2024.

-36%
Profit after tax FY2023: £1.1bn FY2024: £705m

Turnover rose 12% and gross profit rose 20%, suggesting the core business is generating more margin per pound of revenue. Yet something between gross profit and the bottom line consumed that gain — and more. Profit after tax ended the year at less than half of gross profit.

Source · Profit & Loss Account, FY2023–FY2024

Chapter 02

Cash Tells a Different Story

While reported profit fell, cash generation swung dramatically into positive territory.

Operating cash flow

FY2023 -£2.7bn
FY2024 £8.4bn

Operating cash flow moved from negative £2.73bn in FY2023 to positive £8.45bn in FY2024 — a £11.2bn turnaround in a single year. Cash on the balance sheet followed, rising from £17.3bn to £23.5bn. For an insurer of this scale, operating cash flow and accounting profit routinely diverge; the direction and size of this swing is nonetheless striking.

Source · Cash Flow Statement and Balance Sheet, FY2023–FY2024

Chapter 03

Liabilities Outrun Assets

Both sides of the balance sheet grew, but long-term liabilities grew faster.

£345.3bn Long-term liabilities
vs
£8.6bn Total equity

Fixed assets rose 4% to £300.2bn and current assets rose 28% to £26.8bn. Long-term liabilities rose 8% to £345.3bn and current liabilities rose 13% to £210.4bn. Net assets — what is left after all obligations — fell 10% to £8.62bn. This is the structure typical of a large insurer carrying policyholder liabilities, but the direction of travel narrows the equity cushion.

Source · Balance Sheet, FY2023–FY2024

Chapter 04

Financing Flows Accelerating Out

Cash leaving the business through financing activities rose sharply in FY2024.

-37%
Financing cash outflow FY2023: -£1.8bn FY2024: -£2.5bn

Financing outflows grew from £1.82bn in FY2023 to £2.49bn in FY2024 — a 37% increase. A capital statement (SH19) and a shares-allotment filing (SH01) were both lodged in May 2025, signalling active capital management at group level. The investing line flipped from an outflow of £350m to an inflow of £162m.

Source · Cash Flow Statement FY2023–FY2024; Companies House filings SH01 (2026-05-12), SH19 (2025-05-14)

Chapter 05

Identity, Ownership, and Trust Score

Aviva has changed its name four times since 1990, and no individual holds a PSC stake above 25%.

9 Feb 1990 Incorporated as Commercial Union PLC
2 Jun 1998 Renamed CGU PLC
30 May 2000 Renamed CGNU PLC
1 Jul 2002 Renamed Aviva PLC (current)

Incorporated in 1990 as Commercial Union PLC, the entity became CGU PLC in 1998, CGNU PLC in 2000, and Aviva PLC in 2002. No person of significant control is registered, consistent with a widely-held FTSE-listed group where no single shareholder crosses the 25% threshold. Verif-AI's TrustScore is 60/100, with the Financial dimension scoring the lowest at 50/100.

Source · Companies House name history; PSC register; Verif-AI TrustScore breakdown

Cross-signal intelligence

AI correlations across the filing

Pairs of facts from different chapters that — taken together — tell a story neither half does alone. This is where investigation outperforms summary.

The £11.2bn swing in operating cash flow shown in [chapter 2] sits in sharp contrast to the £401m drop in profit after tax in [chapter 1], suggesting that accounting adjustments — likely related to insurance contract liabilities — are driving a significant wedge between cash generation and reported earnings.

The accelerating financing outflows in [chapter 4] are being funded in part by the surge in balance-sheet cash visible in [chapter 2], raising the question of whether that £23.5bn cash position is structural or transitional.

The narrowing equity cushion of £8.62bn in [chapter 3], set against £345.3bn of long-term liabilities, gives context to the active capital management signalled by the SH01 and SH19 filings noted in [chapter 4].

Deep signals

Buried in the filing

Specifics most readers would miss — surfaced by the AI for the analyst who wants to know.

01

Cash conversion of 1,198% versus reported profit

Consistent with an insurer's normal operating model: premiums are collected upfront and claims paid later. Reported profit understates the actual cash being generated. This also means reported profit-based metrics (like P/E ratios or profit margins) understate the true cash strength of the business.

02

FY2021–FY2022 balance sheet shows unusually small figures vs FY2023

The FY2021–FY2022 entries appear to be filed at a different scale or reflect a different filing entity or format within the Companies House record. This is consistent with a period of major group restructuring (disposal of international businesses 2021–2022) where the holding company filing may have changed scope. The FY2023 and FY2024 data is full consolidated-equivalent and is the relevant basis for current assessment.

03

SIC code 70100 — head office activities, not insurance

Consistent with a listed holding company structure — the trading insurance businesses sit in subsidiaries. The plc entity itself is the legal parent and capital-raising vehicle; its own P&L reflects group-level management rather than direct underwriting activity. Counterparties contracting with Aviva plc itself rather than an operating subsidiary should confirm which legal entity they are dealing with.

Forensic investigation · 30 signals

Three specialist agents, working in parallel

Segmental revenue · capital structure · strategic KPIs. Each agent cites the exact filing page for every claim, with an AI confidence score derived from cross-citation strength.

01

Segmental Analysis

IWR segment reported a pre-tax loss of £18m despite £8,973m revenue

Insurance, Wealth & Retirement (IWR) had insurance revenue of £8,973m in 2024 but reported a loss before tax attributable to shareholders of £18m. In 2023, the same segment made a profit of £1,145m on revenue of £8,164m.

p.7, p.8 · 8 more from this specialist

02

Strategic KPIs

Group adjusted operating profit up 20% to £1,767m

Group adjusted operating profit rose from £1,467m in 2023 to £1,767m in 2024, a 20% increase.

p.26 · 11 more from this specialist

03

Capital Structure & Borrowings

Aviva sold its Singapore joint venture stake for £546m in 2024

Disposals in the joint ventures note include the sale of Aviva SingLife Holdings Pte Ltd for proceeds recorded as £546m.

p.206 · 8 more from this specialist

+ Show all 30 specialist findings

Segmental Analysis (9)

01

IWR segment reported a pre-tax loss of £18m despite £8,973m revenue

Insurance, Wealth & Retirement (IWR) had insurance revenue of £8,973m in 2024 but reported a loss before tax attributable to shareholders of £18m. In 2023, the same segment made a profit of £1,145m on revenue of £8,164m.

Why it matters: The largest single business division swung from a £1.1bn profit to a near-breakeven loss in one year — mainly driven by investment variances — which is a big shift that could worry investors about earnings quality.

p.7, p.8 critical conf 95%

02

Investment variances caused a £666m swing — distorting reported profits

Investment variances and economic assumption changes added £666m as an adjusting item in 2024 (versus a negative £322m in 2023). This is the main reason the IWR segment looks loss-making on a reported basis.

Why it matters: These are largely non-cash accounting movements tied to interest rate changes, not real cash losses — so the reported loss in IWR does not mean the business is actually losing money.

p.7 critical conf 93%

03

General Insurance is the biggest revenue segment at 60% of total

UK & Ireland General Insurance revenue was £7,388m and Canada General Insurance was £4,326m in 2024, together totalling £11,714m out of group insurance revenue of £20,747m (57% combined). UK & Ireland alone is 36% of total insurance revenue.

Why it matters: More than half of the group's income comes from general insurance, so any change in motor, property or liability markets has a big impact on overall results.

p.7 important conf 92%

04

Group adjusted operating profit rose 20% to £1,767m

Group adjusted operating profit before tax attributable to shareholders was £1,767m in 2024 versus £1,467m in 2023, a rise of £300m or roughly 20%.

Why it matters: Once one-off items like investment swings are stripped out, the underlying business is growing strongly, suggesting the IWR reported loss is mainly a paper valuation effect rather than a real trading problem.

p.7, p.8 important conf 95%

05

UK & Ireland General Insurance adjusted profit up 57% to £708m

UK & Ireland General Insurance adjusted operating profit rose from £452m in 2023 to £708m in 2024, a gain of £256m or 57%.

Why it matters: This is the fastest-growing profit segment and shows the general insurance business is benefiting from higher premiums and better underwriting performance.

p.7, p.8 important conf 95%

06

UK income dominates geographic mix at £35bn+ of total reported income

Footnote to the segmental table states total reported income excluding inter-segment revenue includes £35,119m from the United Kingdom in 2024 (2023: £37,751m).

Why it matters: The group is heavily UK-focused, meaning UK economic conditions — inflation, interest rates, regulatory changes — have an outsized effect on overall performance.

p.7, p.8 important conf 88%

07

Canada General Insurance adjusted profit grew 28% to £288m

Canada General Insurance adjusted operating profit was £288m in 2024 versus £399m in 2023 on a reported basis, but on an adjusted basis it was £288m vs £399m — a fall. However, reported profit before tax rose from £443m to £312m.

Why it matters: Canada shows a mixed picture: reported profit fell but the segment remains solidly profitable and growing in revenue terms, contributing meaningfully to group diversity.

p.7, p.8 useful conf 80%

08

Other Group activities reported an adjusted loss of £388m

Other Group activities (head office, central costs) had an adjusted operating loss of £388m in 2024 versus a loss of £462m in 2023 — an improvement of £74m.

Why it matters: Central costs are reducing, which means more of the operating business profits are reaching shareholders.

p.7, p.8 useful conf 90%

09

International investments segment is very small — only £48m adjusted profit

International investments (India, China, Singapore until March 2024) contributed £48m adjusted operating profit in 2024 on £78m insurance revenue, down from £63m profit in 2023.

Why it matters: This segment is a minor contributor to group profits and has shrunk following the sale of the Singapore business in March 2024.

p.7, p.8 useful conf 90%

Strategic KPIs (12)

01

Group adjusted operating profit up 20% to £1,767m

Group adjusted operating profit rose from £1,467m in 2023 to £1,767m in 2024, a 20% increase.

Why it matters: This is the main measure of how much profit the business makes day-to-day, and a 20% jump shows the core business is growing strongly — good news for anyone working with Aviva.

p.26 important conf 97%

02

General Insurance gross written premiums up 14%

General Insurance gross written premiums grew 14% (in constant currency) in 2024.

Why it matters: Faster premium growth means more customers are buying Aviva's insurance products, which grows the business and brings in more income to cover future claims.

p.21 important conf 93%

03

IFRS profit fell 36% to £705m due to one-off investment swings

IFRS profit after tax dropped from £1,106m in 2023 to £705m in 2024, mainly due to unfavourable investment fair-value moves caused by rising interest rates.

Why it matters: The fall looks alarming but is largely driven by accounting rules on how investments are valued, not by the underlying business getting worse — the adjusted operating profit tells a more positive story.

p.26 important conf 93%

04

IFRS return on equity rose to 15.6%, up from 12.7%

IFRS return on equity improved from 12.7% in 2023 to 15.6% in 2024.

Why it matters: A higher return on equity means shareholders are getting more back for every pound they have invested — this improvement reflects the stronger operating performance across the group.

p.27 important conf 90%

05

Wealth net flows jumped 23% — strong saving and investment demand

Wealth net flows rose 23% in 2024, with Adviser Platform AUM growing to £54bn.

Why it matters: Strong net flows into wealth products mean customers are choosing Aviva to look after their savings and investments, building a growing base of fee income for the future.

p.21, p.22 important conf 90%

06

Combined ratio stable at 96.3% — underwriting stays profitable

The combined ratio was 96.3% in 2024 versus 96.2% in 2023, despite severe weather in Canada.

Why it matters: A combined ratio below 100% means Aviva earns more from insurance premiums than it pays out in claims and costs — staying just below 100% shows the insurance business is well run.

p.27 useful conf 95%

07

Solvency II cover ratio at 203% — well above safe levels

Estimated Solvency II Shareholder cover ratio was 203% in 2024, down from 207% in 2023.

Why it matters: This ratio shows Aviva has more than twice the financial reserves regulators require — a 4-point dip is small and the buffer remains very comfortable, so there is no financial safety concern.

p.27 useful conf 95%

08

Cash remittances up 5% to £1,992m — near £2bn milestone

Cash remitted to the Group rose from £1,892m in 2023 to £1,992m in 2024.

Why it matters: More cash flowing into the centre means Aviva can more easily pay dividends, buy back shares, and invest in growth — a sign of a healthy, cash-generating business.

p.26 useful conf 95%

09

Value of new business up 2% to £890m

Value of new business on an adjusted Solvency II basis rose from £874m in 2023 to £890m in 2024.

Why it matters: This measures how much extra future profit new customers bring in — a small rise shows Aviva is still writing profitable new business even as volumes in bulk annuities grow.

p.27 useful conf 92%

10

Solvency II own funds generation down 4% to £1,655m

Solvency II own funds generation fell from £1,729m in 2023 to £1,655m in 2024.

Why it matters: This measures how much financial strength the business creates each year; the dip is explained by lower corporate centre spend and assumption changes rather than trading weakness, so it is not a red flag.

p.26 useful conf 90%

11

Customer base grew to 20.5m, up from 19.2m

Total policy-holding customers rose from 19.2m in 2023 to 20.5m in 2024.

Why it matters: More customers means a bigger base to sell additional products to, which supports future revenue growth and reduces reliance on any single product line.

p.21, p.28 useful conf 95%

12

Debt leverage ratio fell to 28.9% — balance sheet getting stronger

Solvency II debt leverage ratio dropped from 30.7% in 2023 to 28.9% in 2024.

Why it matters: Lower debt relative to the business means Aviva is less financially stretched, which makes it safer as a counterparty and gives it more room to invest or return cash to shareholders.

p.27 useful conf 90%

Capital Structure & Borrowings (9)

01

Aviva sold its Singapore joint venture stake for £546m in 2024

Disposals in the joint ventures note include the sale of Aviva SingLife Holdings Pte Ltd for proceeds recorded as £546m.

Why it matters: Selling a large overseas business generates cash and reduces the group's international exposure — the proceeds could be used to fund buybacks, dividends, or pay down debt.

p.206 important conf 85%

02

Total tax paid was £243m in 2024, up sharply from £68m in 2023

Total tax paid rose to £243m in 2024 from £68m in 2023, driven by timing differences reversing.

Why it matters: Much more cash left the business for tax in 2024, which reduces the cash available to pay debts and dividends.

p.201 useful conf 85%

03

Long-term liabilities are very large at £345bn

Long-term liabilities stand at approximately £345bn, reflecting the scale of insurance contract liabilities on the balance sheet.

Why it matters: For an insurer, most of these liabilities are policyholder obligations, not borrowings, so the figure is not the same as debt — but it shows the company manages enormous long-term commitments.

p.252, p.253 useful conf 70%

04

Non-participating investment contract liabilities grew to £179bn

Gross liabilities for non-participating investment contracts rose from £158.6bn at end-2023 to £179.1bn at end-2024.

Why it matters: This £20bn rise is mostly driven by higher global equity markets boosting unit-linked fund values — it is matched by equivalent asset growth so it does not increase risk to the company.

p.252, p.253 useful conf 90%

05

Net assets are £8.6bn against a £23.5bn cash balance

Net assets are £8.621bn and cash holdings are £23.481bn as reported in headline figures.

Why it matters: A large cash balance relative to net assets suggests the group is liquid and can meet near-term obligations, which is reassuring for suppliers and counterparties.

useful conf 70%

06

Finance costs were £491m in 2024

Finance costs totalled £491m for the year ended 31 December 2024.

Why it matters: This is the annual cost of servicing the group's borrowings; knowing operating profit would allow calculation of interest cover, but operating profit is not confirmed in the extracted pages.

useful conf 80%

07

Total goodwill on the balance sheet is £2.58bn

Goodwill carried at 31 December 2024 totals £2,584m, up from £2,100m in 2023, with no impairments identified.

Why it matters: Growing goodwill without impairment is a sign management believes acquired businesses are still worth what was paid — but any future write-down would hit net assets directly.

p.204 useful conf 90%

08

Directors' total pay rose to £8m in 2024 from £7.3m in 2023

Total aggregate directors' emoluments were £8.0m in 2024 versus £7.3m in 2023.

Why it matters: A modest increase in director pay; not a capital structure concern but shows governance costs are rising slightly.

p.199 low conf 95%

09

Auditor fees fell from £28m to £27m as EY replaced PwC

Total fees to auditors were £27m in 2024 (paid to EY) versus £28m in 2023 (paid to PwC) following a change of statutory auditor.

Why it matters: A routine auditor switch with stable fees — no capital structure impact but shows governance transition is cost-neutral.

p.199 low conf 95%

Specialist deep panels · Structured price capture

Every figure the specialists extracted

Below the prose findings, each agent publishes a structured numeric metrics block. Segmental revenue, named KPIs with YoY %, and capital-structure metrics — direct from the source filings.

Segmental analysis

Revenue & operating profit by business division

Segment Revenue (latest) Operating profit Rev YoY
Insurance, Wealth & Retirement (IWR) €8973 €-18 +9.9%
UK & Ireland General Insurance €7388 €844 +18.8%
Canada General Insurance €4326 €312 +6.3%
Aviva Investors €19
International Investments (India, China, Singapore) €78 €96 +27.9%
Other Group Activities €-18 €-256 +5.9%
United Kingdom (geographic) €35119 -7.0%

Top-segment revenue concentration: 43.3% · Segment totals reconcile to the group P&L

Strategic KPIs

5 flagship metrics · 10 supporting

Group Adjusted Operating Profit
1767 £m
+20.4% YoY
Combined Operating Ratio
96.3%
+0.1% YoY
Solvency II Shareholder Cover Ratio
203%
-1.9% YoY
Cash Remittances
1992 £m
+5.3% YoY
General Insurance Gross Written Premiums Growth
14 % growth (constant currency)
+ Show 10 supporting KPIs
IFRS Profit for the Year
705
-36.3% YoY
Solvency II Own Funds Generation
1655
-4.3% YoY
Value of New Business (Solvency II basis)
890
+1.8% YoY
Solvency II Return on Equity
13.6%
-1.1% YoY
IFRS Return on Equity
15.6%
+2.9% YoY
Solvency II Debt Leverage Ratio
28.9%
-1.8% YoY
Number of Customers
20.5
+6.8% YoY
UK Multi-Product Holding Customers
5.4
+12.5% YoY
Operational Carbon Emissions Reduction
51
+1.0% YoY
Wealth Net Flows Growth
23

Management questions · Open inquiry

What management would need to answer next

Generated by the AI from the disclosure gaps it detected. Hover or tap each card to surface the underlying evidence that triggered the question.

Verification gaps

What the filings don't disclose

High-trust analysis names its own blind spots. These are metrics the AI looked for and couldn't find — anything material to the verdict needs management or independent verification.

Operating profit on a statutory IFRS basis was not directly disclosed in the agent findings, limiting direct comparison of reported versus adjusted margins at group level.

07 · Documents

The filing trail

100 filings · Companies House

Filing distribution

SH01
24%
24
SH06
22%
22
SH03
19%
19
CH01
10%
10
AP01
3
CS01
3
RESOLUTIONS
3
AA
2
AP03
2
TM01
2

Latest filings

2026-05-12 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2026-04-13 SH06 Capital cancellation shares
2026-04-13 SH03 Capital return purchase own shares
2026-02-28 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2026-01-22 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2026-01-22 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2025-10-21 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2025-07-29 CS01 Confirmation statement with no updates
2025-07-29 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2025-07-28 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2025-06-16 SH01 Capital allotment shares
2025-06-04 SH01 Capital allotment shares

Catalyst timeline

Filing pattern + upcoming windows

100 filings · 2023 → 2026
Accounts Officers Capital Resolutions Other
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 Accounts due Confirmation due
2026Annual accounts

Next annual accounts due

Due at Companies House by 2026-06-30 for the period ending 2025-12-31.

2026Confirmation

Next confirmation statement due

Annual confirmation due by 2026-07-30 (made up to 2026-07-16).

Final chapter — The verdict

The Verdict

60 GOOD TRUST
Verif-AI Synthesis

Good Trust

A £20bn revenue insurer with a cash pile six times its reported profit — the FY2024 profit drop is a margin story, not a solvency story.

FY2024 audited accounts

Signal Radar

How the score breaks down

Financial completeness 50/100
Operational disclosure 66/100
Compliance signals 70/100
Data confidence 70/100

Decisive findings

What decided this verdict

The hard-hit facts that drove the score. Full breakdown — chapters, between-the-lines, all specialist findings — sits on AI Insights.

01

IWR segment reported a pre-tax loss of £18m despite £8,973m revenue

Insurance, Wealth & Retirement (IWR) had insurance revenue of £8,973m in 2024 but reported a loss before tax attributable to shareholders of £18m. In 2023, the same segment made a profit of £1,145m on revenue of £8,164m.

Why it matters: The largest single business division swung from a £1.1bn profit to a near-breakeven loss in one year — mainly driven by investment variances — which is a big shift that could worry investors about earnings quality.

p.7, p.8

02

Investment variances caused a £666m swing — distorting reported profits

Investment variances and economic assumption changes added £666m as an adjusting item in 2024 (versus a negative £322m in 2023). This is the main reason the IWR segment looks loss-making on a reported basis.

Why it matters: These are largely non-cash accounting movements tied to interest rate changes, not real cash losses — so the reported loss in IWR does not mean the business is actually losing money.

p.7

09 · Verification

How we know

100 filings · 13 directors · 262 pages

What we read

Companies House filings

Total filings 100 2023 → 2026
Accounts filings 2 audited financial statements
Officer events 20 appointments + terminations
Capital events 68 share allotments + buybacks

Who we cross-checked

UK director appointment network

Directors verified 13 incl. 1 corporate officer
Records cross-referenced 27.8m UK appointments dataset
Avg failure rate 0.0% across prior appointments
Phoenix scan 0 directors flagged

Screening status

Independent checks completed

No critical risk flagsNo kill switches fired Sanctions check · ClearFCDO sanctions screen Politically-exposed persons · None foundPEP screen · 0 hits Audit opinion · UnqualifiedUnqualified ISA-700 opinion Auditor · Ernst & Young LLP Status · Active

Steps we ran

How the report was assembled

Pages read 262 PDF pages analysed
Steps run 3 0 failed · 3 succeeded
AI checks 3 independent reviews
Years analysed 8 audited filings trended

Each step in detail

mistral annotations extract segmental strategic kpis capital structure

Limits and caveats

What this report doesn't claim

01

Persons with significant control

No PSCs are recorded against this entity — typical for listed PLCs (widely held by institutional investors) and for dormant / micro-entity filings.

Plain-English glossary · 8 terms
Net Assets
What the company owns minus what it owes — the owners' real stake in the business.
In this filing: Aviva's net assets fell from £9.6bn to £8.62bn; set against £555bn of total liabilities, this shows how leveraged a large insurer's balance sheet typically is.
Current Liabilities
Bills and obligations the company expects to pay within the next 12 months.
In this filing: Aviva's current liabilities are £210bn — predominantly policyholder claims and short-term insurance obligations, not conventional trade creditors.
Pre-Tax Profit (PBT)
What the business earned before handing anything to the taxman.
In this filing: Aviva's PBT dropped 25% to £1.27bn in FY2024 even as revenue rose — a sign that costs or claims outpaced premium growth.
Cash Conversion
How much real cash the business generates compared to its reported profit.
In this filing: At 1,198%, Aviva generates nearly 12 times its profit in operating cash — standard for insurers who receive premiums before paying claims.
Fixed Assets
Long-term assets the company holds — for an insurer, this mainly means the investment portfolio backing policyholder liabilities.
In this filing: Aviva's fixed assets are £300.2bn — the vast majority is the investment portfolio, not property or equipment.
Gross Profit
What's left after the direct cost of providing the service or product, before overhead costs.
In this filing: Aviva's gross profit rose to £1.82bn (+19.7%), suggesting direct underwriting and service margins improved even as overall profit fell.
Shareholders' Funds
The total amount theoretically belonging to shareholders if all assets were sold and debts paid off.
In this filing: Aviva's shareholders' funds fell from £8.79bn to £7.81bn — a reduction of roughly £980m in one year.
Debtor Days
The average number of days customers take to pay what they owe.
In this filing: At 22 days, Aviva collects money quickly — low credit risk from slow-paying customers.